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Michael M .Prinzing: The Interpretation Theory of Life’s Meaning 
(Under the direction of Susan Wolf) 
 
 This paper offers a theory of the many meanings of “meaning”. The basic idea is that 
meanings are the correct answers to interpretive questions. Interpreting something involves 
answering a question by situating that something into a framework of facts. Life can be 
meaningful, therefore, because it is an object of interpretation. The paper has itself does what this 
theory describes. It takes something puzzling (talk of life’s meaning) and answers a question 
(“What is this all about?”) by integrating it into a larger context (a general theory of meaning). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly thought that the search for life’s meaning, which is seen across cultures 
and historical periods, reflects an innate human need (Frankl, 1971). In fact, quite a good case 
could be made for adopting a measure of perceived meaning as the “flagship indicator of well-
being” (Steger, Shin, Shim, & Fitch-Martin, 2013). For the feeling that one’s life is meaningful is 
linked with a host of indexes of physical, mental, and social flourishing (Steger, 2017).1 It is 
clear, in short, that life’s meaning is very important to us. What’s not clear is what it is.  
Most philosophers interested in this topic focus on the substantive question of what 
makes life meaningful. Seldom do they engage with the prior, conceptual question of what we 
are even talking about when we talk about life’s meaning. This is surprising, given that 
philosophers typically pride themselves on conceptual clarity and precision. One obvious reason 
to start with the conceptual question is that doing so would help us assess substantive theories. It 
                                               
1 Perceived meaning is associated with better physical health and longevity (Boyle, Barnes, 
Buchman, & Bennett, 2009; Krause, 2007, 2009; S. E. Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & 
Gruenewald, 2000). It is strongly correlated with life satisfaction (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & 
Kaler, 2006; Steger, Oishi, & Kesebir, 2011) and positive affect (King, Hicks, Krull, & Del 
Gaiso, 2006; Steger, Kashdan, Sullivan, & Lorentz, 2008), thus capturing “subjective well-
being”. It is also linked with other measures of psychological flourishing: optimism, self-esteem 
and self-acceptance (Steger, Kashdan, & Oishi, 2008); quality social relations and a sense of 
belonging (Lambert et al., 2010, 2013; Stavrova & Luhmann, 2016; Stillman et al., 2009); 
generativity (Schnell, 2011); and personal self-expression (Steger, Kashdan, Sullivan, et al., 
2008). It also buffers against stress (J. Park & Baumeister, 2017), depression (Steger & Kashdan, 
2009) and other maladies (Marco & Alonso, 2019), which may be why low levels of perceived 
meaning are such strong predictors of PTSD in military veterans (Owens, Steger, Whitesell, & 




is difficult, after all, to assess a theory without a clear understanding of what it’s a theory of. The 
trouble—and reason for aversion to the conceptual question—is that the topic is so notoriously 
slippery. We seem to talk about it in many different ways and it is hard to see what could unify 
them (perhaps a family resemblance Metz, 2001, 2013a, pp. 34–35). Some think that there is no 
(or at least no coherent) concept of life’s meaning (Oakley, 2010). But the standard response to 
the apparent chaos is to simply not take a stand on what, if anything, unifies these different ways 
of thinking and talking about the subject. That is, most philosophers interested in life’s meaning 
attempt to isolate and clarify one of the things we sometimes seem to be talking about (e.g., 
Wolf, 2010), or propose revisionist theories not beholden to ordinary ways of thinking or talking 
(e.g., Calhoun, 2015; Višak, 2017).  
This paper searches for the signal in the noise. It aims to make sense of the myriad ways 
in which we think and talk about life’s meaning by integrating them into a more general account 
of meaning. This account—the interpretation theory—claims that a meaning is what one learns 
when one correctly interprets something. In §2, I explain interpretation, and apply the schema 
provided by the theory to talk of life’s meaning. People talk about many things when they talk 
about life’s meaning. But, in each case, life has meaning(s) because it can be interpreted. The 
different ways of thinking and talking reflect different ways of interpreting life, and different 
things that “life” can refer to. In §3, I consider some empirical evidence suggesting that there is a 
detectable pattern in, and a particular interest behind, our interpretations of life. Typically, 
people talking about life’s meaning are talking about whether, why, and how it matters. §4 




interpretation theory. The theory, I argue, makes sense of what otherwise appears to be a 






CHAPTER 2: THE INTERPRETATION THEORY 
“Meaning” has many meanings. “Meaningful” is applied to: words, sentences, stories, 
natural signs (e.g., the rings in a tree trunk), events, activities, and entire live. Some philosophers 
think that life’s meaning is totally unrelated to these other kinds of meaning (Kauppinen, 2012, 
2016; Martela, 2017, p. 234). “Clearly,” Antti Kauppinen writes, “life doesn’t have a meaning 
like words or signs do. It… would be misleading to look for meaning of life in this direction” 
(2012, pp. 352–353). Of course, words and lives are not meaningful in the same way. But, then, 
neither are words and natural signs. Such differences don’t imply that these notions “have 
nothing to do with” each other (Kauppinen, 2016, p. 282). The different uses of “meaning” are 
not like the different uses of “bank” (the financial institution and the side of a river). There is, I 
my view, an underlying unity: what something means is what you would learn if you interpreted 
it properly. More formally, X means Y iff Y is a correct interpretation of X. (I modify this below 
to clarify “correct interpretation”.) Thus, life (like words or natural signs) has meaning because it 
admits of correct interpretation.2 To clarify this view, I’ll first discuss interpretation, and then 
consider how we interpret life in particular. 
                                               
2 This does not entail that being meaningful requires actually being interpreted. Just as kale is 
nutritious even if it rots in the fridge, a note can be meaningful even if it slips underneath the 
fridge and is consequently never read or interpreted. The kale is nutritious because, if it’s eaten, 




Section 2.1 What is interpretation? 
Interpreting something—i.e., “decoding and making explicit its meaning” (Skinner, 1972, 
p. 394)—involves “getting at the message” it conveys (Kuhns, 1960, p. 7).3 As Charles Taylor 
writes, interpretation “is an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object of study… [it] aims 
to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense” (1971, p. 3). Thus, we can understand 
interpretation as a sense-making process. This implies that meanings are derived by making 
(proper) sense of meaning-bearers. 
In my view, making sense of something involves fitting it coherently into a web of 
background knowledge.4 To illustrate, suppose I’m driving down the road, when I see some 
orange cones. I quickly realize what they mean: that the left lane is closing up ahead. As a result 
of my visual experience, I formed a new belief that there were cones arranged in a certain 
configuration in the road. This belief was then integrated into a much larger web of beliefs about 
traffic cones and road maintenance, the rules of the road, and so on. This allowed me to make 
sense of (comprehend) the cones because I was able to situate my new belief about them into this 
web. The new belief cohered with the old ones and their combination allowed me to predict what 
will happen down the road.  
                                               
3 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term “meaning” first appeared in English in 
the 14th century. Meaning was said to be possessed by propositions and stories, but also dreams, 
signs, and omens. In each case, meanings were messages or information derived from meaning-
bearers. Meaning was often understood to be something non-obvious, and in some cases even 
mysterious. For instance, only those with special powers could decipher the meaning of (i.e., 
interpret) divine signs or omens.  
4 The view, thus, entails a kind of meaning holism (Jackman, 2014). Meaning does not depend 





This account of interpretation is empirically plausible. As a couple of psychologists put 
it, interpretation involves “linking something new or perplexing to existing knowledge 
structures… The interpreting mind takes the target stimulus and thinks how it relates to what it 
already believes” (Baumeister & Landau, 2018, p. 5). These interpretive “knowledge structures” 
are sometimes called “meaning frameworks” (George & Park, 2016). They are understood to be 
networks of claims (either implicitly or explicitly accepted) about how things are and how they 
work. In short, the picture of interpretation that we get from psychology is this: “When 
individuals encounter something… that is not currently related to an existing framework… it 
said to be meaningless… [it only appears] meaningful once a relationship… is discovered or 
imposed” (Proulx & Heine, 2006, p. 310). And thus, “[w]hen we ask what something means, we 
are trying to locate that something within our web of mental representations” (Martela & Steger, 
2016, p. 537). 
It’s important to clarify that these “webs”, “frameworks”, or “networks” of beliefs aim to 
represent facts. They are supposed to be veridical, and only lead to correct interpretations when 
they are. One can interpret something “correctly” by the standard of one’s beliefs, yet still 
misinterpret it because those beliefs are mistaken. For instance, in the driving example, if I 
believed that orange cones were used only to draw drivers’ attention to potholes, I would have 
concluded something erroneous about their meaning. In light of my mistaken beliefs, the 
erroneous conclusion might have been justified. But it would nevertheless have been a 
misinterpretation. X means Y, I have claimed, iff Y is a correct interpretation of X. (It will soon 




Interpretations answer questions. When one interprets smoke and knows that it means 
fire, the question might be “Where is that coming from?” or “What is the cause of this?” 
Scientists interpreting data are asking, “What would best explain these observations?” In 
interpreting speech, we are typically attempting to answer the question, “What is this person 
trying to communicate?” Interpreting something does not require having a consciously formed 
question in mind. But it does require asking (in some way) a question (of variable determinacy 
and abstraction). Generally, we should expect that the more practiced one is at a certain kind of 
interpretation, the more automatic and non-conscious the process becomes.5 Someone learning a 
new language might, in interpreting a string of letters, need to consciously ask herself what 
sound the “ñ” makes. In contrast, in the driving example, I might not consciously entertain the 
question “What are those doing there?” Nevertheless, in the effort to be a vigilant driver, I was 
trying to anticipate what was up ahead and so did implicitly ask that question. 
Correctly interpreting something involves correctly answering some such interpretive 
question. Thus, X means Y iff Y is an interpretation of X which correctly answers an interpretive 
question, Z, asked of X. To illustrate, interpreting the orange cones allowed me to answer the 
question, “What are those doing there?” My answer—that the left lane will be closing—was 
                                               
5 People are constantly interpreting the world around them, and the vast majority of this 
interpretive work is done non-consciously (Griffin & Ross, 1991; Ross, 2014). For instance, 
we’ve been interpreting our sensory inputs for so long that we don’t need to think about it. We 
don’t see fields of red and yellow arranged in a complicated pattern; we see an apple. That is, 
what we consciously experience is just the apple. But obviously, for that to happen, our brains 
needed to process sensory inputs, apply a concept, etc. That they can do this so quickly is a 
remarkable feat (just ask computer scientists struggling to produce equally competent “computer 
vision”). And it’s even more remarkable that it’s all done under the hood of conscious 
awareness—we don’t even have to think about it. The search for life’s meaning is thus an 




correct because a lane closure was indeed up ahead. False beliefs (e.g., that orange cones are 
used solely to inform drivers of potholes) can lead to misinterpretation because they can lead the 
interpretive process to yield incorrect answers, even when the process was otherwise faultless.  
Some questions admit of multiple correct answers. “What is he doing?”, might correctly 
be answered by: “Hammering a nail”, “Building a wall”, “Building a school”, or “Building 
something that will benefit future generations”. The same physical movements might aptly be 
interpreted in all of these ways. Each is an answer to the same interpretive question. Where they 
differ is in terms of the frameworks that they situate those movements into. 
Different interpretive questions can be asked and answered of a single object. Consider 
an utterance. One interpretive question is what the speaker is trying to communicate. Another is 
what is revealed about her character by the fact that she intended to communicate what she did. 
Works of literature are another example. There was, presumably, something that Shakespeare 
was trying to say with the play Hamlet. That’s one of Hamlet’s meanings. But there are many 
interpretive questions one might ask of the play besides “What was Shakespeare trying to say?” 
We might ask: “What does this story illustrate about the experience of grief?”; “Do we all suffer 
from a tragic kind of folly like Hamlet’s?”; or “Does Hamlet’s unusual psychology display 
features unique to heterosexual men, or something more general about the human condition?” 
Section 2.2 Interpreting life 
According to the interpretation theory, understanding what people are talking about when 
they talk about meaning requires specifying: (1) what they are interpreting (what the meaning-
bearer is); (2) what question is being asked or answered; and (3) what framework, or network of 




meaning. Doing so will reveal why the topic is so confusing, and thus why it may appear to be 
simply confused. “Life” can refer to a number of things. So, there are a number of potential 
interpretive objects. Depending on which of these one is interpreting, and upon the interpreter’s 
interests, different questions will be more or less relevant, and different contexts will be more or 
less appropriate. 
Sometimes a “life” is a person’s activities. When an angsty teenager tells his parents to 
stay out of his life, he is telling them to be less involved in his affairs. We can think of these as 
parts of a life: the projects, decisions, failures, triumphs, and so on that compose a life; or even 
whole “chapters” of a life, like one’s childhood or time in college. These are, I think, typical 
interpretive objects when people talk about the meaning in one’s life. (Relationships, projects, 
etc. are things going on in a life.) One natural context in which to interpret a part of one’s life is 
the whole of it. Indeed, empirical research shows that, in interpreting their experiences, people 
typically use “life-schemas”—their sense of who they are and their life story—as the interpretive 
framework (Janoff-Bulman & Berg, 1998; C. L. Park, 2010; Thompson & Janigian, 1988). To 
illustrate, a person wondering whether his work is meaningful might be wondering, “Is this a 
project of worth?” (Wolf, 2010). And, to answer that question, he might try to see how the 
project fits with his values and aspirations, whether it followed naturally from past efforts, or 
might lead to future projects that he considers valuable, etc. Of course, he could also interpret the 
project by situating it into a larger network of facts. For instance, he might think that his work 
can only truly be of worth if it has value for other people, not just himself. Thus, he might 




“Life” can also refer to a whole life: Albert Einstein’s, say, or Nelson Mandela’s. This is, 
it seems, the interpretive object when we talk about the meaning of a life. When I think about the 
meaning of Mandela’s life, I’m not considering specific decisions or events. I’m looking at the 
whole thing.6 Given that the interpretive object is a whole life, natural contexts would include a 
family and its history (Velleman, 2005), a community, country, or perhaps even human history 
broadly. When interpreting whole lives, common interpretive questions might include: “Was this 
life the cause of good effects?” (Smuts, 2013) and “Did it make a valuable contribution to 
society?” (Martela, 2017). Paradigmatically meaningful lives (e.g., Einstein’s and Mandela’s) are 
ones that provide strong, affirmative answers to questions like these. 
“Life” can also refer to something larger—not a specific life, but Life itself. This rather 
opaque expression might refer to the existence of humanity, or of living beings of any kind. This 
is, I take it, the interpretive object when people talk about The Meaning of Life. People interested 
in the meaning of Life, are not focused on any particular life, or even any group of lives, but on 
something grander (Levine, 1988; Seachris, 2009). If that’s so, then the appropriate interpretive 
context would be the entire world, or even the cosmos. This is presumably why “What is the 
meaning of Life?” is often called the “cosmic question” about life’s meaning (Martela, 2017; W. 
Wong, 2008). Questions one might ask here include: “For what purpose was humanity created?”; 
“Does life end with the death of the body?”; or “Is there something that all living beings (do or 
should) strive for?” If this is right, it explains why people tend to think that one needs a religious 
                                               
6 Naturally, this is not to say that the meaning of whole is independent of the meaning of the 
parts. Similarly, the meaning of a sentence is determined by the words in it. But the meaning of 
the sentence is not the same thing as the meaning of any individual word. Similarly, Mandela’s 
life is meaningful in virtue of what he did with it. But the meaning of his (whole) life is not the 




worldview in order to think that Life has meaning. For it’s not entirely clear whether these 
interpretive questions could have answers in the absence of a divine plan, or some such thing. 
But perhaps there are other sensible interpretive questions to which Life might provide secular 
answers.  
It’s worth noting that the interpretation theory thus explains why so many philosophers 
think that questions about life’s meaning are “amalgams of logically diverse questions” 
(Hepburn, 1966, p. 262; Metz, 2001). The question of life’s meaning, some claim, “is not so 
much a single question but a place-holder for a whole set of questions” (Baggini, 2005, p. 1). 
This is because, as I’ve claimed, interpretations answer questions. And there are lots of questions 







CHAPTER 3: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF (PERCEIVED) MEANING IN LIFE 
Though interpretations of life can involve numerous kinds of interpretive objects, 
frameworks, and questions, some are sure to be of greater interest than others. One interpretive 
question we might ask of a person’s life is “What lessons can be learned from her terrible 
mistakes?” But we certainly don’t want our own lives to reveal answers to that sort of question. 
To direct ourselves towards the kind of meaning that people seek in life, we should take a cue 
from the empirical psychological literature. This literature is far too massive even to summarize 
here. But a brief explanation of some relevant findings should be illuminating.7 
Psychologists and philosophers have somewhat different interests when it comes to life’s 
meaning. It is important, therefore, to be careful in drawing philosophical lessons from empirical 
research. Philosophers are interested in what meaning is, or what would make something 
actually meaningful. “The aim of psychological research… is more modest. It aims to look at the 
subjective experiences of human beings and asks what makes them experience meaningfulness in 
their lives” (Martela & Steger, 2016, p. 532). Thus, “meaning”, when it appears in the 
psychological literature, needs to be read as “perceived meaning”—or “p-meaning” for short. 
                                               
7 In the last few decades, interest in life’s meaning has mushroomed in both psychology 
(Markman, Proulx, & Lindberg, 2013; P. T. Wong, 2013), and philosophy (Metz, 2013b). Yet, 
with rare exceptions, both sides have ignored each other. This is unfortunate. Greater 




Perceptions of a thing should not be confused with the thing itself. But one can learn about what 
people are looking for by considering when they think they’ve found it. 
Until fairly recently, psychological research on this topic was something of a definitional 
mess. The field displayed little consensus about what was being studied, and there were about as 
many measures of p-meaning as people researching it (Brandstätter, Baumann, Borasio, & Fegg, 
2012). “Meaning”, in other words, was treated as “an umbrella term” (Steger, 2017, p. 75) with 
“no consensus definition” (Hicks & King, 2009, p. 638). Some researchers understood p-
meaning as a sense of purpose in life (Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964; Ryff, 1989). This is likely 
due to the impressive influence of Viktor Frankl (1971), for whom a meaningful life is one spent 
in pursuit of some purpose. Aaron Antonovsky (1987), on the other hand, understood p-meaning 
as the perception of coherence. Other researchers have similarly claimed that p-meaning is the 
feeling that life “makes sense”, or is comprehensible (Baumeister, 1991; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 
2006). Others understood p-meaning as the feeling that one’s life is “significant, important, [or] 
worthwhile” (Morgan & Farsides, 2009, p. 198). And it’s become increasingly clear that feeling 
that one’s life matters is crucial for p-meaning (George & Park, 2014). (More on this below.) 
The response to this multiplicity of definitions has been inclusive. Each is now thought to 
be getting at different parts of a single, complex phenomenon (George & Park, 2016; Martela & 
Steger, 2016). This response is motivated by the fact that perceived purpose, comprehension, and 
mattering—though conceptually, and sometimes empirically distinguishable (George & Park, 
2013; Martela & Steger, 2016)—are very highly correlated. In other words, people who perceive 




the feeling that life makes sense; (2) feel purposeful, that they have goals, projects, and direction; 
and (3) see their lives and/or activities as valuable, as mattering somehow. 
The interpretation theory would explain these empirical findings thusly. Interpreting life 
naturally produces a feeling of having made sense of things—i.e., perceived comprehension. The 
questions people typically ask and answer in interpreting life are variations on the theme of 
mattering. Indeed, this theme is detectable in the interpretive questions suggested in §2.2: “Is this 
a project of worth?”, “Did this life contribute anything of value to the world?”, “Was it a cause 
of good effects?” These are different ways of specifying the question, “Does this matter?” 
Typically, when people feel that their activities aren’t meaningful, I take it they are doubting 
whether what they do really matters. And when people despair about the meaning of their life, 
the operative question seems typically to be something like, “Does my life matter?” Indeed, the 
ultimate expression of meaninglessness would seem to be, “Nothing really matters.”8 This theme 
is also reflected in substantive philosophical theories. As one commentator notes, most 
“contemporary analytical philosophers… take questions about [life’s] meaning to be questions 
about importance or significance, about what (if anything) matters” (O’Brien, 1996, p. 339). In 
his paper on the concept of life’s meaning, Thaddeus Metz goes so far as to say that, when 
applied to life, “meaningful” is synonymous with “important”, “significant”, or “matters” (Metz, 
2001, p. 138). Hence, when a participant in psychological research responds affirmatively to a 
statement like, “At present, I find my life very meaningful” (P. T. Wong, 1998), I think what 
                                               
8 Another paradigmatic expression is “What’s the point?” This is more evocative of purpose than 
mattering. But an activity’s having a point or purpose only makes it meaningful (in the sense we 
are considering now) if is a valuable one. This is evidenced by the fact that “What’s the point?” 





they are saying is that they (believe they have) made sense of their lives in such a way that their 
lives seem to matter. Purpose enters the picture because one only adopts some goal as one’s 
purpose in life when one thinks that it matters whether that goal is pursued or achieved. So, to 
have and pursue a life purpose is to have and pursue some goal or project that one takes to 
matter. This will naturally lead to greater perceptions of mattering. Moreover, it will be hard for 
many people to see their lives as mattering if they aren’t doing anything with them. So, lacking 
purpose should lead to lower levels of perceived mattering. In this way, the interpretation theory 







CHAPTER 4: MEANING AND MATTERING 
The upshot of the preceding sections is this: for life to have meaning is for it to answer 
(when interpreted) some question, and the kinds of questions that people usually ask are 
variations on, or specifications of, “Does this (life in any of its senses) matter?” Now, to matter is 
typically to make a noteworthy difference. For instance, if your accountant tells you that it 
doesn’t matter which tax deduction you take, what she’s saying it that it won’t make a 
noteworthy difference to your return. It’s also a platitude about meaningful lives that they “make 
a difference”. Combining this understanding of mattering with the view I’ve been developing 
yields some interesting implications about life’s meanings. 
Section 4.1 Positive and negative mattering 
Since noteworthy differences can be good or bad, something can matter in a good way 
(like getting a promotion) or a bad way (like getting cancer). This, I think, is why people are 
often hesitant to say that, for instance, Adolph Hitler’s or Osama bin Laden’s lives were 
meaningless—terrible as they were (Landau, 2011a). It’s certainly not the case that these lives 
didn’t matter. They fit unsettlingly well some of the central platitudes about meaningful lives: 
they made a difference, were a part of something larger than themselves, and contributed 
something to the world. It consequently feels strange to say that their lives were meaningless. 




good. Hence, we are conflicted. In the effort to avoid this bind, a number of philosophers now 
like to say that such lives have negative or “anti-meaning” (Campbell & Nyholm, 2015), or that 
they “anti-mattered” (Metz, 2013a, pp. 63–64, 233–236).  
The idea of meaning as negative mattering might seem strange to philosophers 
accustomed to thinking of meaning as a kind of value. But empirical research shows that people 
asked about meaningful events in their lives do frequently mention negative experiences: 
hardships, failures, and tragedies (Hardcastle, 1985; McLean & Thorne, 2003; Vohs, Aaker, & 
Catapano, 2019). And research on post-traumatic coping shows that people don’t generally think 
of their traumas as meaningless (Janoff-Bulman & Berg, 1998; Schwartzberg & Janoff-Bulman, 
1991). In fact, finding meaning in them is an essential part of “post-traumatic growth” (Pals & 
McAdams, 2004; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Many of the standard substantive theories would 
have difficulty accommodating these empirical findings. If some part of one’s life is meaningful 
iff it makes a valuable contribution to the world (Martela, 2017), elicits fitting fulfillment (Wolf, 
2010), involves successful engagement with projects of value (Kauppinen, 2012), or is the 
proximate cause of good effects (Smuts, 2013), then how could failure, trauma, or tragedy 
possibly be (or be thought) meaningful? The answer appears to be that hardships are meaningful 
because they matter—for good or ill. 
Some hardships end up making an overall positive difference in a person’s life. Consider 
a drug user who nearly overdoses and wakes up in a hospital surrounded by worried family 
members. This traumatic experience might help him to see that his family is more important than 
the high. Were it not for this terrible experience, he might never have had this epiphany. He 




has it, failure is the greatest teacher. Learning a lesson “the hard way”, as the drug user did, can 
be quite meaningful—perhaps more meaningful than an easy success, since we grow most when 
we face challenges. Thus, a person looking back on his life may interpret a negative experience, 
not as a pointless waste, but as an important milestone in his life, an integral part of an overall 
positive story. Hardships aren’t good for their own sakes, of course. But the difference they make 
in one’s life can ultimately be good. It seems right for our former drug abuser to say, in 
hindsight, that his near-overdose eventually led his life to be more meaningful. 
Yet many hardships don’t lead to later successes or lessons learned. Many make overall 
negative differences in people’s lives. While these don’t plausibly make one’s life more 
meaningful, they are still parts of one’s life and can have meaning. Consider, for example, being 
diagnosed with terminal cancer. No one asked why her life is meaningful would respond, 
“Because I was diagnosed with terminal cancer.” But, if asked about a meaningful event in her 
life, such a person would likely cite the diagnosis. To find meaning in an event in one’s life is to 
make sense of it—usually with an eye towards why it matters. And even overall negative events 
can make noteworthy differences in one’s life. They can indicate, for instance, that one’s life is 
coming to an end. Or, they can matter insofar as they shape one into the person one becomes. 
One might look back and think, “That period of my life—foolish and futile as it was—is still 
meaningful because it made me who I am today.” In saying this, one need not claim that the 
foolish and futile period led to something good or was on balance positive. One might just be 
recognizing the difference that it made in the constitution of one’s identity.9 
                                               




Now, to be clear, negative mattering is not what people hope for. When people seek to 
live meaningful lives, they clearly want their lives and activities to matter in good ways. And, 
again, I take it that people would not say that overall negative hardships make their lives 
(considered as wholes) more meaningful. The point is that the interpretation theory can explain 
the fact that people sometimes consider bad lives and the negative parts of life to be meaningful.  
It might also explain why, as others have noted, people sometimes use “meaningful” as a 
catch-all commendation—applying it to nearly any good-making feature of a life (Martela, 2017, 
p. 247; Matheson, 2018; Woodard, 2017). It would be easy to attribute this practice to 
terminological sloppiness. But the interpretation theory suggests a way of making it sensible. If 
the kind of meaning that we hope to find in life is a positive answer to the question of whether it 
matters, and if positive mattering is just making a valuable and noteworthy difference, then most 
of the good-making features of a life will contribute to its meaning. 
Section 4.2 Mattering in context 
Differences that are noteworthy in one context can fail to be noteworthy in others. For 
instance, fluctuations in the price of a particular good might matter a lot in some local economy, 
but not at all in the global economy. Similarly, a life might make a valuable and noteworthy 
difference for a local community but have no appreciable effect on the course of human history, 
much less the history of the cosmos. This is why many have thought that, from the point of view 
of the universe (sub specie aeternitatis), human lives are meaningless—even if they can be 
meaningful from a more human point of view (e.g., Blackburn, 2002, p. 79; Nagel, 1971; 
Tolstoy, 1899; for contrary views, see Seachris, 2013; Landau, 2011b). Thinking about the 




Thomas Nagel put it, the “thought that you’ll be dead in two hundred years is just a way of 
seeing your life embedded in a larger context” (1987, p. 96). Adopting different points of view, 
or standpoints, influences assessments of life’s meaning because doing so involves locating life 
in different networks of facts. 
We can come to conflicting assessments of meaning because, while our lives may well 
make noteworthy differences in Earthly contexts, they don’t in cosmic contexts. Nagel (1971, 
1989, Chapter 11) calls this the “problem” of life’s meaning. From the point of view of the 
universe (interpreted in a cosmic context), one’s life—indeed the existence of all of humanity—
doesn’t seem to matter, as our existence will have no real effect on the story of the universe. But 
from the ordinary, human point of view (interpreted in more local contexts), our lives and many 
of the things in them matter enormously. Our ability to adopt these two perspectives generates an 
awkward—sometimes quite distressing—intrapersonal tension that Nagel called the feeling of 
“absurdity”.  
Speaking for myself, I think people shouldn’t care about making cosmic differences. 
There are more local ways of mattering that we should care more about.10 This is not to say that 
the kind of meaning we should seek is always most apparent in the smallest contexts. Recall the 
earlier example of the man hammering a nail. The descriptions which interpret his physical 
movements in larger contests (“building a school”, or “building something that will benefit 
future generations”) seem more meaningful, in a sense now relevant, than the descriptions which 
                                               
10 Compare: “If I can stop one heart from breaking, / I shall not live in vain; / If I can ease one 
life the aching, / Or cool one pain, / Or help one fainting robin, / Unto his nest again, / I shall not 




interpret it in smaller contests (“hammering a nail” or “building a wall”). Larger contexts are 
sometimes necessary to see why something matters. 
The interpretation theory has some similarities with Robert Nozick’s account of life’s 
meaning. Nozick claimed that “[a]ttempts to find meaning in life seek to transcend the limits of 
an individual life” (Nozick, 1981, p. 83). Now, exceeding the speed limit does not (barring 
unusual circumstances) make one’s life meaningful.11 Of course, the fact that one is speeding 
does mean that one is breaking the law and might mean that one will be pulled over. But it 
doesn’t have the kind of meaning that we care about. It doesn’t mean anything about whether (or 
to what degree) one’s life matters. So, transcending limits makes life more meaningful only 
insofar as doing so makes one’s life matter in some bigger picture than it otherwise would have. 
Thus, Nozick was right that “meaning involves connection to wider context”, and that to ask 
about “something’s meaning is to ask about how it is connected, perhaps in specified ways, to 
other things” (Nozick, 1981, pp. 86, 83). But, the kind of meaning that people typically seek in 
their life requires that it be of value in some wider context and connect with other valuable 
things. This is why, as others have noted, attempts to answer questions about life’s meaning are 
attempts “to locate our lives in a context that will provide them with significance and value” 
(Cottingham, 2004, p. 9 emphasis added). 
                                               
11 I say “barring unusual circumstances” because any apparently meaningless part of a life might 
actually be meaningful depending on the details of the life in which it occurs. Consider going to 
a crappy sushi restaurant. Considered in isolation, this appears not to be a meaningful thing to 
do. But suppose that the people going to that restaurant are on their twentieth anniversary date, at 
the place where they first met. That does seem meaningful. Or consider pleasure, which is 
commonly considered good but not meaningful (Martela, 2017, p. 235; Metz, 2012, p. 443). 
Consider someone who, after many years of rivalry and alienation, takes pleasure in his sister’s 
success. His doing so might indicate that he has outgrown childish sibling animosity and seeks 




Section 4.3 Mattering: psychological and simpliciter 
There are different ways in which something can matter. Something can matter to 
someone. If something matters to me it is something I care about—something that elicits certain 
cognitive, motivational, and affective responses from me. Most people’s lives do in fact matter to 
them. And they often matter to other people too: their family, friends, etc.12 Many people are 
apparently satisfied with mattering in this way, which would explain why most people think their 
lives are pretty meaningful (Heintzelman & King, 2014). But some people want their lives and 
activities to matter even to people they’ll never meet (e.g., by “making history”). And yet others 
want even more. Tolstoy illustrates this desire rather theatrically: 
The question, which in my fiftieth year had brought me to the notion of suicide, was the 
simplest of all questions… ‘What will come from what I am doing now, and may do 
tomorrow? What will come from my whole life?’ Otherwise expressed… ‘Is there any 
meaning in my life that will not be destroyed by the inevitable death awaiting me?   
(1899, p. 20)13 
                                               
12 When asked about the most meaningful things in their lives, people overwhelmingly mention 
relationships with others, especially family and close friends (Delle Fave, Vissing, Brdar, Vella-
Brodrick, & Feire, 2013; Lambert et al., 2010; Martela, Ryan, & Steger, 2018; Steger, 2013; 
Steger, Shin, Shim, & Fitch-Martin, 2013). To illustrate, in one study, fully 82% of participants 
listed some kind of relationship as the biggest source of meaning in their lives (Lambert et al., 
2010). Importantly, people find the most meaning in helping or caring for others or doing 
something valued by others (Baumeister, Vohs, Aaker, & Garbinsky, 2013). One experimental 
study found that volunteer work and spending money on others led to greater p-meaning, and 
that the mechanism was increased self-worth (Klein, 2017). That is, benefiting others leads one 
to see oneself and one’s activities as more valuable, and it’s this that increases p-meaning. This 
supports the idea that, in interpreting their lives, people are looking to see whether they 
(positively) matter. And, it seems, mattering to others is typically sufficient. 
13 For Tolstoy (and many others), the inability to perceive one’s life as meaningful leads 
naturally to thoughts of suicide. In my view, this is because that inability is an inability to see 
why one’s life matters, to see any value in it. And if there is no value in one’s life, why bother to 




Tolstoy seems to have been unsatisfied with his life’s mattering to him, those around him, and 
even to readers (like us) whom he would never meet. He wanted his life to matter, not to 
someone, but simpliciter. I don’t have a theory of simpliciter mattering, nor am I sure that it’s a 
respectable notion. But it is clearly something that people, and not just Russian novelists, take 
seriously (Hare, 1972; Parfit, 2011, pp. 410–413). 
These different ways of mattering (psychological and simpliciter) are reflected in so-
called “subjectivist” and “objectivist” theories of meaning. Broadly speaking, subjectivists think 
that whether one’s life is meaningful depends on whether one possesses certain mental states, 
usually attitudes like fulfillment or pride (Frankfurt, 2002; Rowlands, 2015; R. Taylor, 1970). In 
other words, subjectivists think that, to be meaningful, one’s life must matter to oneself. 
Objectivists, on the other hand, claim that whether one’s life is meaningful depends on subject-
independent facts (Bramble, 2015; Martela, 2017; Metz, 2013a; Nozick, 1989). Such views 
could be spelled out in terms of psychological mattering (e.g., one’s life could matter to others, 
which would be sufficient for subject-independence). Or they could require that one’s life matter 
simpliciter. Hybrid views, meanwhile, claim that one’s life is meaningful when it meets both 
conditions (Evers & Smeden, 2016; Wolf, 1997, 2010). In other words, to be meaningful, a life 
must matter—must make a valuable and noteworthy difference—both subjectively (to oneself), 
and objectively (simpliciter or to others).  
This way of thinking about what these substantive theories are claiming might help to 
advance the debate between them. I’m inclined to think that it supports a variant of objectivism. 
If one misinterprets one’s life, one could fail to see its meaning. Hence, thinking one’s life is 




(and who therefore lacked the characteristic emotions, like fulfillment and love) might still be 
living a meaningful life insofar as it matters to others or simpliciter.14 Thus, one way for a life to 
be meaningful is for it to matter to the person living it. But this isn’t necessary. One’s life can 
matter even when one lacks the characteristic positive attitudes, and even if one’s own judgment 
is to the contrary. 
  
                                               
14 Another possibility is for a life to matter to the person living it, but not simpliciter. I imagine 
nihilists would say something like: “People’s lives do often matter to them. But such people are 
under Pollyannic delusions. Their lives don’t really matter (i.e., simpliciter), and so aren’t really 
meaningful.” Of course, if mattering simpliciter is not a respectable notion, then it’s the nihilist 
who is deluded. To really matter would be to matter in a way that it is actually possible to matter. 






CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY OF THE INTERPRETATION THEORY’S MERITS 
Hopefully, by now many of the merits of the interpretation theory are already clear. But 
before concluding, I’ll review them.  
The interpretation theory claims that the meaning of X is Y iff Y is a correct answer to an 
interpretive question, Z, asked of X. This relatively simple claim has remarkable explanatory 
power. First, it unifies life’s meaning with other kinds of meaning. Sometimes the value of X is 
an utterance, sometimes the rings in a tree, and sometimes life. This explains why so many kinds 
of things—including, inter alia, language, natural signs, and life—are considered meaningful. 
The view also unifies the different ways of talking specifically about life’s meaning. 
Distinguishing several related but distinct referents of “life” reveals why people sometimes talk 
of meaning in a life (when X = a part of a life), the meaning of a life (when X = a whole life), 
and the meaning of Life (when X = Life itself). There are also numerous values that Z can take—
i.e., one can ask many interpretive questions of the same object. Thus, the view explains why 
philosophers think that questions about life’s meaning are “amalgams” of different questions 
(Hepburn, 1966, p. 262; Metz, 2001), and “not so much a single question but… a whole set of 
questions” (Baggini, 2005, p. 1). 
The theory explains why life’s meaning is often considered “deep”, as depth imagery is 
common in discussions of interpretation. Interpretation “aims to bring to light an underlying 




1972, p. 394). It is thought to involve going “beyond the given”, and bringing to light what was 
implicit (Bruner, 1973). Meaning is deep because it is that which interpretation reveals. 
By understanding interpretation as a sense-making process, the view explains why, in 
other languages, expressions translatable as “life’s meaning” usually employ the language of 
sense-making. For instance, in French the expression is, “le sens de la vie”, and in German “der 
Sinn des Lebens”. Similarly, “yìyì” and “imi” in the Chinese and Japanese expressions 
(“shēngmìng de yìyì” and “jinsei no imi” respectively) are also translatable as “sense” or 
“significance”. 
The theory also dovetails with psychological research on p-meaning. For instance, Roy 
Baumeister claims that the search for meaning in life “reflect[s] the desire to construct some 
interpretation of one’s life” (1991, p. 61). Other psychologists have appealed to interpretation 
without using the term—for instance, by claiming that p-meaning is the “output of having made 
sense of something” (Rosso, Dekas, & Wrzesniewski, 2010, p. 94; Pratt & Ashforth, 2003). 
Indeed, the editors of a research handbook write that “all accounts of meaning converge at sense 
making” (Markman, Proulx, & Lindberg, 2013, p. 4). Thus, one merit of the view is that it may 
provide some common ground for fruitful interdisciplinary collaboration. 
In §4.1, we saw how pairing the interpretation theory with psychological evidence about 
the kinds of interpretive questions people ask of life (common values of Z) generates further 
explanatory power. It explains the possibility of negative meaning (either of hardships in a life, 
or bad lives like Hitler’s). People are usually interested to know whether their lives (or the parts 
of their lives) matter, and things can matter in positive and negative ways. The view also 




positive mattering in our lives, and positive mattering involves making a valuable difference, 
most good-making features of a life can contribute to its meaning.  
In §4.2, we saw how the view explains why thinking about the cosmos or the distant 
future leads people to feel that their lives aren’t meaningful. Adopting different points of view, 
or standpoints, influences assessments of meaning because doing so involves the use of different 
networks of facts. And life appear to matter in some but not all of these contexts. 
Finally, in §4.3, we saw how the view understands the claims of subjectivist, objectivist 
and hybrid theories. They appeal to different kinds (or ways) of mattering. One might consider a 
life meaningful just when it matters to the person living it (as subjectivists claim), or just when it 
matters in some subject-independent way (as objectivists claim). One might also consider it 
meaningful just when it matters in both ways (as hybrid theorists claim). 
Another merit, which has not yet come up, is that the theory accounts for the non-
additivity of meaning. For contrast, pleasure is plausibly an additive good. If one wanted to know 
how pleasant yesterday was, one could take each individual moment of the day, measure how 
much pleasure one felt at that moment, and simply add these momentary scores to calculate the 
pleasantness of the whole. Many think that this picture is not plausible when it comes to meaning 
(Brännmark, 2003; Kauppinen, 2012; McMahan, 2002, pp. 174–182; Velleman, 1991; W. Wong, 
2008). One can’t calculate the meaning of a life by adding up the meaning of its constituent time 
slices. One can’t even assess the meaning of a time slice without knowing how it fits into the 
larger picture of one’s life. One doesn’t know, for instance, how meaningful a relationship is 
without at least knowing how it will end, and if it does how it prepares one for future 




comes afterwards, on how all the parts hang together. Or so many people think.15 And this view 
clearly sits quite nicely with the interpretation theory. Something’s meaning depends on how it 
should be interpreted. And interpreting something involves situating it into a network of facts—
that is, seeing how it fits into a larger picture. 
Many philosophers, for related reasons, appeal to narratives in theorizing about life’s 
meaning (Fischer, 2005; Kauppinen, 2015; MacIntyre, 1981; Seachris, 2009; Velleman, 1991; 
W. Wong, 2008). This is presumably because many of our beliefs are structured as narratives 
(Baumeister & Newman, 1994), and we often make sense of things by telling stories about them 
(Niles, 2010). Many people think about the universe in terms of a narrative—starting with a 
divine creation, perhaps, or the big bang. The same is true of the way people think about their 
country or nation. Culture generally is typically transmitted through stories (e.g., fables, 
histories, and mythology). And culture is widely recognized as providing a framework in which 
people make sense of things (George & Park, 2016). Of particular relevance are self- or life-
schemas (Markus, 1977; Thompson & Janigian, 1988). People tend to think of themselves as the 
protagonists in stories of their own making.16 And they use these stories to interpret their 
experiences (McAdams, 2001; McLean & Pasupathi, 2011; Pals, 2006; Thompson & Janigian, 
1988). Thus, the desire for a meaningful life partly reflects the fact that many people “care 
intensely for the narrative of [their] own life and very much want it to be a good story, with a 
                                               
15 Seeing  meaning “requires connecting events into a whole, making sense of them, fitting them 
into a pattern [perhaps] by telling a story… To make sense of [something] requires seeing it as a 
part of a larger process” (Thomson, 2003, p. 142). 
16 There may be some exceptional people who are not inclined to do so (Strawson, 2004). But 
empirical research suggests that this is at least the norm (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; 




decent hero” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 387). There is some evidence that people with a clear sense of 
narrative identity experience greater p-meaning (Bauer, McAdams, & Pals, 2008), the same goes 
for people who think more about their past and future, as opposed to the present moment 
(Baumeister, Vohs, Aaker, & Garbinsky, 2013). The interpretation theory does not directly entail 
a connection between meaning and narrative. But, given that so many people so commonly use 
narratives (about their lives, their communities, and even the universe) to interpret things, it 







CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This paper offered a theory of the many meanings of “meaning”. The basic idea is that 
meanings are the correct answers to interpretive questions. Interpreting something involves 
answering a question by situating that something into a framework of facts. Life can be 
meaningful, therefore, because it is an object of interpretation. The paper has itself done what 
this theory describes. It took something puzzling (talk of life’s meaning) and answered a 
question (“What is this all about?”) by integrating it into a larger context (a general theory of 
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